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Abstract
In my view, human rights must fi nd an appropriate philosophical foundation/
justification to be incorporated into non-Western societies and such a 
foundation/justifi cation must be attractive and inspiring for ordinary citizens 
in those societies and be based on their own intellectual resources, including 
local languages. In contemporary Japan, ‘KEN RI (権利)’ is considered as the 
Japanese term corresponding to human rights. However, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the 
most infl uential intellectual leader of the early Meiji period, introduced human 
rights as ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’. The Chinese character ‘KEN (権)’, in the 
most fundamental text of Confucianism, the teachings of Confucius (551-479 
B.C.), Analects, means being able to weigh occurring events and determine 
the application of principles to them. In the account of Tomonobu Imamichi, 
a Japanese philosopher, ‘GI (義)’, usually considered as justice, originally 
meant responsibility. Thus, ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ can be reinterpreted as 
being able to practically apply principles (理) to those events, while assuming 
responsibility (義) before Heaven and the community to which the person 
belongs. This view of humans as being embedded in communities and as centers 
of responsibility in the secular and transcendental dimensions is apparently 
different from the Western philosophical view of humans as rational beings 
with the capacity to act according to the universal law, but still defends human 
rights and the democratic development of society.
Key words: human rights, philosophical foundation, Confucianism.
Resumo
Em minha opinião, os direitos humanos precisam encontrar uma fundamentação/
justifi cação fi losófi ca apropriada para serem incorporados em sociedades não 
ocidentais, e tal fundamentação/justifi cação precisa ser atraente e inspiradora 
para os cidadãos comuns dessas sociedades e estar baseada em seus próprios 
recursos intelectuais, incluindo a língua local. No Japão contemporâneo, ‘KEN 
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RI (権利)’ é considerado o termo japonês que corresponde a direitos humanos. 
Entretanto, Fukuzawa Yukichi, o mais infl uente líder intelectual do início do 
período Meiji, introduziu os direitos humanos como ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’. 
No mais fundamental texto do confucionismo, nos ensinamentos de Confúcio 
(551-479 a.C.) intitulados Analectos, o caractere chinês ‘KEN (権)’ signifi ca ser 
capaz de ponderar os eventos que ocorrem e de determinar a aplicação de 
princípios a eles. Na proposta do fi lósofo japonês Tomonobu Imamichi, ‘GI 
(義)’, geralmente tido como justiça, signifi ca originalmente responsabilidade. 
Assim, ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ pode ser reinterpretado como ser capaz 
de aplicar na prática princípios (理) a esses eventos, ao mesmo tempo em que 
se assume responsabilidade (義) diante do Céu e da comunidade à qual se 
pertence. Essa concepção do ser humano como ser imerso em comunidades 
e como centro de responsabilidade nas dimensões secular e transcendente 
é aparentemente distinto da concepção fi losófi ca ocidental do ser humano 
como ser racional capaz de agir de acordo com a lei universal, mas ainda assim 
defende os direitos humanos e o desenvolvimento democrático da sociedade.
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos, fundamentação fi losófi ca, confucionismo.
Introduction
In this article, I would like to present an alternative conception of the Japanese 
philosophical foundation for human rights.
Human rights contain legal norms and their underlying foundation (Taylor, 
1999), as Charles Taylor aptly puts forward. 
Human rights must find an appropriate philosophical foundation/justification 
to be incorporated into non-Western societies and such a foundation/justification 
must be attractive and inspiring for ordinary citizens in those societies and be based 
on their own intellectual resources, including local languages.
For instance, even basic human needs such as desire for food, water and 
communication take on different expressions in different languages.
So, although basic human needs constitute the foundation for human rights, 
we still need a different reasoning/justification, specific to each language and society.
It is also my basic assumption that each society, which sometimes is not lim-
ited by territorial boundaries in the age of globalization, has its own social moral 
order with a certain conception of humans and society, historically developed in 
that society. In other words, any philosophical justification of human rights must 
contain a particular conception of social moral order with its own philosophical 
view of humans and society.
This philosophical justification of human rights could be formulated by de-
constructing and reconstructing each local tradition/culture and through a dynamic 
intermingling and interaction among communities within a state and other societies 
beyond national borders (Levy, 2010).
For this exercise, a ‘neo-communitarian’2 approach seems useful and viable in 
East Asia because what we need in the midst of ongoing individualization without 
individualism in East Asia (Kyung-Sup and Min-Young, 2010) is a new normative 
reasoning for the vision of the future which individualization is bringing into East 
Asia, and such normative reasoning must be based on the tradition available in the 
region, well-known to ordinary citizens (Han and Shim, 2010). 
2 The term ‘neo’ of ‘neo-communitarian” means breaking away from all traditional and authoritarian types of 
collectivism and simultaneously embracing and defending individuality within a fl ourishing community (Han 
and Shim, 2010). 
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In this sense, a neo-communitarian reasoning on human rights based on 
traditions is worth exploring.
I believe that articulating neo-communitarian reasoning(s) on human rights 
in East Asia will complement and enrich the promising cosmopolitan approach to 
human rights as a cosmopolitan imperative advocated by Ulrich Beck, particularly 
in East Asia (Beck, 2002; Beck and Grande, 2010).
In advance, I would like to present my propositions as follows:
(i)  Universal human rights can and should be justified by different cultures 
through their own terms and perspectives, expecting that an overlapping 
consensus on the norms of human rights may emerge from those self-
searching exercises and mutual dialogue3.
(ii)  North-east Asian societies, China, Korea and Japan, share the Confucian tradi-
tion, even though Japan has never been a Confucian state in a strict sense.
(iii) Every society has a particular social moral order, including its own concep-
tion of humans and society, supported and developed in its own tradition, 
including language.
(iv) The Neo-confucian conception of self, articulated by Tu-Weiming as a 
center of relationships and as a dynamic process of spiritual development 
(Tu, 1986, p. 113), is compatible with the modern conception of self as 
the subject of human rights in the West.
(v)  Likewise, Japan could formulate an alternative conception of self, utilizing 
the intellectual resources in East Asia, although its composition might be 
different from the ones in China and Korea.
An alternative model of self
Even today, a considerable number of Japanese people show a sense of un-
easiness toward human rights, claiming, for instance, that teaching human rights 
to children makes them selfish and egoistic and that children must first learn obliga-
tion and responsibility, although both the government and citizens formally follow 
human rights as the legal norms.
In order to address this ambivalent attitude of Japanese people toward human 
rights, it seems useful to employ the dual distinction of human rights presented by 
Charles Taylor, namely human rights as legal language and their underlying philosophi-
cal foundation4. To Japanese people, individualism as the underlying foundation of 
human rights, which they feel originated in the West, is something foreign although 
they adhere to human rights as official legal norms imposed by the government.
In Taylor’s account, in the West, the ideas of modern society were articulated 
as the theory of natural law in the 17th century mainly by Grotius and Locke. This 
theory is based on a certain conception of human being and society, which is that 
individuals, on their own judgments, voluntarily come to an agreement with each 
other and form society in order to promote their mutual benefit. Individuals are 
supposed to be endowed with natural rights as subjects of rights. This modern self, 
as an autonomous and rational agent, is supposed to take a disengaged stance 
toward the world, including themselves, and to be able to act as sovereign people, 
formulating a commonly elaborated opinion in the public sphere while managing 
to make a living as an independent agent in the market economy (Taylor, 2007).
3 Joseph Chan contrasted the ecumenical approach with the fundamentalist approach, which is that there 
are universal values and moral principles on the basis of which one can justify human rights to all reasonable 
persons (Chan, 1999).
4 “The notion of (subjective) rights both serves to define certain legal powers and also provides the master 
image for a philosophy of human nature, of individuals and their societies” (Taylor, 1999, p. 127).
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This concept of human being, of self as the subject of rights5, is the key con-
cept of the modern social imaginaries in the West, including human rights.
So, we may raise the question whether modernity, be it the first or the second, 
be it stretched or compressed, is possible with a different conception of the self. 
Is the Western modern self the only possible modern self?
Both empirical and historical studies refute this claim.
Çiğdem Kağitçibaşi, a Turkish psychologist, makes the following point: 
American (and Western) psychology, both refl ecting and reinforcing the individualistic 
Western cultural ethos, has drawn the line narrowly and sharply, constituting a clear 
boundary between self and non-self (Kağitçibaşi, 1996, p. 55).
She employs the three ideal-typical family/human models:
(i)  The model of inter-generational interdependence in both the material and 
the emotional dimension, 
(ii)  The model of complete independence in both dimensions,
(iii) The model of emotional interdependence without material independence 
(Kağitçibaşi, 1996, p. 76-97).
She holds that it is widely observed that although material dependence on 
parents by children decrease with socioeconomic development in the Majority World 
(non-Western societies), emotional dependency remains (Kağitçibaşi, 1996, p. 86). 
In her account, the third model reveals the causal antecedents of the devel-
opment of the autonomous-related self through societal/familial change, which 
integrates both autonomy and relatedness (Kağitçibaşi, 1996, p. 89).
Taylor also admits that the Western modern notion of inner and outer is 
strange and without precedent in other cultures and times (Taylor, 1989, p. 114)6.
In Taylor’s account, what distinguishes the West from the others in terms of 
modernity is that the process was accompanied by a growing sense of uneasiness 
towards church-controlled collective rituals and magic and that secularization in 
the West has evolved as a negation of magic, religious collective rituals, while in 
Japan collective rituals are not seen negatively7. 
In my view, this explains why the Western modern self had to enclose its 
boundaries completely. On the contrary, in Japan, the porous self did not find it 
necessary to close itself against the world completely.
So, based on this self model, Japan could be defined as the society in which 
self remains partially porous, “relational” in Kağitçibaşi’s term, even after it is in-
stitutionally modernized.
Japanese philosophical foundation for human 
rights: A reinterpretation of the conventional 
understanding of ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’
Now I would like to put forward my idea of the Japanese philosophical foun-
dation for human rights.
5 Taylor explained the meaning of subjective right as something on which the possessor, subject of right, can 
and ought to act in order to put it into effect (Taylor, 1989, p. 11).
6 Taylor also holds that this very clear-cut distinction (between ‘this world’, or the immanent, and the 
transcendent) is itself a product of the development of Latin Christendom (Taylor, 2007, p. xvii-xix).
7 In an interview with Charles Taylor on November 15th, 2008 (Taylor, 2009).
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First, I will explain the brief history of the translation of human rights into 
Japanese, KEN (権) RI (利), refer to the ensuing criticism around this translation and 
then discuss another translation of human rights by Yukichi Fukuzawa, KEN (権) RI 
(理) TSUU (通) GI (義).
Then, I will present my own re-interpretation of KEN (権) KEN (権) RI (理) TSUU 
(通) GI (義)as a plausible alternative. I will, then, compare this alternative formation 
with the one based on Theravada Buddhism in Thailand and the modern Chinese 
self articulated by Tu Wei-Ming.
Finally, I will highlight the difference between this Japanese philosophical 
view of human and society and the one developed in the West. 
The brief history of translating human rights in Japan
‘KEN RI (権利)’ is now considered as the Japanese term corresponding to 
human rights.
‘KEN (権)’, the Chinese character, appeared in the Chinese classics such as 
“XUN ZI (荀子)”, the Confucian book written by Xun Zi (荀子) (313-238 B.C.), which 
at the time meant power and benefit. 
‘KEN (権)’ in the modern meaning appeared as the Chinese translation of 
human rights in the Chinese version of Elements of International Law, which was 
originally published in 1836 by Henry Wheaton (1785-1848), translated into Chinese 
and published by William Martin (1827-1916) in 1864 and immediately introduced 
in Japan. Then, the Japanese text(万国公法) was published by Kaiseijo, the center 
for research and education of Edo-shogunate, the feudal regime of Japan, in 1865. 
It was translated by Amane Nishi, who is usually considered as the first scholar who 
introduced the concept of human rights in Japan.
Akira Manabu pointed out that Nishi mixed up the two different KEN (権)s, 
the traditional meaning of power and the translated meaning of right, which was 
a meaning strictly opposed to power in the history of Western thought8.
Manabu comments as follows:
Today we use the word kenri, which is often expressed with a character ken, such 
as the same ken of woman and man, and ken to enjoy sunshine etc. The traditional 
meaning of ken is, I believe, still living. 
Ken has inevitably some sense of thrusting or by force. For instance, when we mention 
this word in our daily life, we are apt to feel constrained. This word feeling is living 
in the concrete expression of this word in its ordinary use (Manabu, 1982, p. 172).
In Manabu’s account, when Nishi translated the original Dutch text of Ele-
ments of International Law, he chose ‘KEN (権)’ as the term for “regt”, a Dutch word 
which meant both power and law in the sense that the international law (“regt”) 
is based on a nation’s “regt”, which means power (Manabu, 1982, p. 162-165).
Manabu holds that KEN (権) was first introduced as a term of public law by 
Nishi and must have had an unexpectedly deep influence upon the minken (freedom 
and civil rights) movement in the 1870’s and 1880’s. In Manabu’s account, minken 
campaigners demanded essentially the same KEN(権) as the one of government, i.e. 
power as the right to participate in politics, while they did not care so much about 
KEN(権) of the fundamental human rights (Manabu, 1982, p. 171).
8 Akira Manabu, The History of Translating Words in Japan (翻訳語成立事情), originally published in Japanese 
by Iwanami Bookstore in 1982. The English version in the following URL is a test translation by the author 
(http://www.japanlink.co.jp/ol/rig.html).
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However, in the early Meiji period, there was another attempt at translating 
human rights.
Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential intellectual leader of the day, intro-
duced human rights as ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ or ‘KEN RI (権理)’ in the second 
article of Gakumon no susume (An Invitation to learning), published in 1873. Fu-
kuzawa explained ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ as the great justice (大義) meaning 
that people should respect life, preserve property and care for honor. In Fukuzawa’s 
account, ‘KEN RI(権理)’ is the freedom in which each human can seek the fulfillment 
of their own desire without hindering others. It should be noted that instead of RI 
(利), which usually means profit, Fukuzawa employed RI (理), which is considered as 
the ultimate principle beyond Heaven and Earth, but also exists in each individual 
thing, according to the philosophy of the Chu His school (Yukichi, 2005, p. 21-22).
Apparently, Fukuzawa’s translation grasped the meaning of human rights 
much more accurately than Nishi’s one.
Now, following Fukuzawa’s account, I would like to reexamine and reconstruct 
the Japanese terms for human rights.
An alternative reinterpretation of ‘KEN RI TSUU GI 
(権理通義)’
It is said that ‘KEN(権)’, the Chinese character, originally meant power and 
benefit.
However, in the most fundamental text of Confucianism, the teachings of 
Confucius (551-479 B.C.), Analects, ‘KEN (権)’ was used differently.
There are some with whom we may study in common, but we shall fi nd them unable 
to go along with us to principles. Perhaps we may go on with them to principles, but 
we shall fi nd them unable to get established in those along with us. Or if we may get 
so established along with them, we shall fi nd them unable to weigh occurring events 
along with us (The Confucian Analects, 2009, p. 225-226).
KEN (権)’ in this chapter means being able to weigh occurring events and 
determine the application of principles to them (The Confucian Analects, 2009, 
p. 226). ‘KEN (権)’ in this meaning does not have any reference to power. Rather, 
‘KEN (権)’ in this chapter means the capacity for practical reasoning and dealing 
with occurring events.
‘GI (義)’, usually considered as justice, has also a different meaning. Tomonobu 
Imamichi, a Japanese philosopher, holds that ‘GI (義)’, the Chinese character, origi-
nally signifies I (我) shouldering sheep, the victim animals dedicated to Heaven, 
which means that I assume both vertical responsibility before Heaven and horizontal 
responsibility before the fellow villagers who entrusted to me the sacred mission of 
presenting the victim animal to Heaven at the festival. In Imamichi’s account, ‘GI (義)’ 
was introduced in Europe from China at the end of 17th century and translated into 
“justice” in the 18th century, since there had been no English term for “responsibil-
ity there until the late 18th century. Imamichi holds that ‘GI (義)’ originally meant 
responsibility (Imamichi, 2010, p. 172-174).
Now, if we accept the above-mentioned two different interpretations of ‘KEN 
(権)’ and ‘GI (義)’, we could formulate a different reasoning on human rights.
‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ means being able to weigh occurring events 
and determine the application of principles (理) to them while assuming respon-
sibility (義) before Heaven and the community to which the person belongs. 
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This reinterpretation of ‘KEN RI TSUU GI (権理通義)’ presupposes the view of humans 
as being embedded in communities and as centers of responsibility in the secular 
and transcendental dimensions.
This view of humans is compatible with the autonomous relational self pre-
sented by Kağitçibaşi.
Now, let me try to compare this conception with the other East Asian 
formations.
Taylor contrasts Theravada Buddhism with the Western modern discourse on 
human rights and democracy. According to Taylor, in Thailand there were several 
attempts to reinterpret the majority religion, Theravada Buddhism, in the 19th cen-
tury (Taylor, 1999, p. 133). 
Taylor summarizes the two major principles in this reform movement which 
have created a basis for a democratic society and human rights as follows.
The fi rst is the notion, central to Buddhism, that ultimately each individual must take 
responsibility for his or her own Enlightenment. The second is a new application of the 
doctrine of nonviolence, which is now seen to call for a respect for the autonomy of 
each person, demanding in effect a minimal use of coercion in human affairs (Taylor, 
1999, p. 134).
Taylor concludes that while both democracy and human rights have been 
furthered along with the exclusive humanism stressing the incompatible importance 
of the human agent in the West, the convergence on a policy of defense of human 
rights and democratic development in Thailand took a different path, but arrived 
at the same norms (Taylor, 1999, p. 135-136).
Tu Wei-Ming also explained the East Asian social norm as follows.
The sense that one is obliged to, and responsible for, an ever-expanding network of 
human relatedness may not be a constraint on one’s independence and autonomy. On 
the contrary, since personal dignity is predicated on one’s ability not only to establish 
oneself but also to take care of others, one’s level of independence and autonomy 
is measurable in terms of the degree to which one fulfi lls obligations and discharges 
responsibilities to family, community, state, the world, and Heaven (Wei-Ming, 1997, 
p. 8). 
The view of humans as being embedded in communities and as centers of 
responsibility in the secular and transcendental dimensions, striving to become 
capable to weigh occurring events and determine the application of principles to 
them, is apparently different from the Western philosophical view of humans as 
rational beings with the capacity of acting according to the universal law.
However, as Taylor concludes about the Thai case, this view of humans also defends 
human rights and the democratic development of society.
Conclusion
My proposition is that the cosmopolitan nature of human rights is compat-
ible with and even complemented by the neo-communitarian approach, specific to 
each region, based on the ecumenical approach articulated by Joseph Chan, which 
is the idea that universal human rights can and should be justified by different 
cultures through their own terms and perspectives, expecting that an overlapping 
consensus on the norms of human rights may emerge from those self-searching 
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exercises and mutual dialogue. Hence, in my understanding, we should be satisfied 
with the claim that Asian values, whether from Confucianism or Buddhism, can be 
compatible with human rights as the universal social norm.
One of the remaining questions for my approach is whether human rights in 
this current form are as universal as legal language.
Responding to this, I would like to refer to the following tripartite distinction 
presented by Charles Taylor.
It might help to structure our thinking if we made a tripartite distinction.
What we are looking for, in the end, is a world consensus on certain norms of conduct 
enforceable on governments.
To be accepted in any given society, these would in each case have to repose on some 
widely acknowledged philosophical justifi cation, and to be enforced, they would have 
to fi nd expression in legal mechanisms.
One way to putting our central question might be this: What variations can we imagine 
in philosophical justifi cations or in legal forms that would still be compatible with a 
meaningful universal consensus on what really matters to us, the enforceable norms? 
(Taylor, 1999, p. 129).
We may have to develop and articulate a regional common legal form in East 
Asia, which has already been developed in the European, African and American 
continents as the regional human rights charters. Additionally, it should be noted 
that one of the main reasons why African states wished to create their own regional 
charter of children’s rights was that they felt that the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, adopted at United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1989, 
does not reflect the specific needs of African children.
Another more fundamental issue has to do with the Japanese philosophical 
foundation for human rights. In this article, I only focus on the alternative inter-
pretation of human rights based on the most fundamental text of Confucianism, 
Analects. 
Although Chinese culture, including its characters and Confucian teachings, is 
one of the main foundations of the so-called “Japanese culture”, Japan has different 
social moral orders of non-Confucian origin and of local uniqueness.
So, the next challenge might be the explication and articulation of political 
identities based on such a locally oriented uniqueness that are compatible with 
liberal democratic principles9.
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